Can competition among privately issued fiat currencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum work? Only sometimes and partially. To show this, we build a model of competition among privately issued fiat currencies. We modify the current workhorse of monetary economics, the Lagos-Wright environment, by including entrepreneurs who can issue their own fiat currencies to maximize their utility. Otherwise, the model is standard. A purely private arrangement fails to implement an efficient allocation, even though it can deliver price stability under certain technological conditions. Although currency competition creates problems for monetary policy implementation under conventional methods, it is possible to design a policy rule that uniquely implements an efficient allocation. We also show that unique implementation of an efficient allocation can be achieved without government intervention if productive capital is introduced. Finally, we investigate the properties of bounds on money issuing and the role of network effects.
Introduction
Can competition among privately issued fiduciary currencies work? The sudden appearance of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other cryptocurrencies has triggered a wave of public interest in privately issued monies. 1 A similar interest in the topic has not been seen, perhaps, since the vivid polemics associated with the demise of free banking in the English-speaking world in the middle of the 19th century (White, 1995) . Somewhat surprisingly, this interest has not translated, so far, into much research within monetary economics. Most papers analyzing the cryptocurrency phenomenon have either been descriptive (Böhme, Christin, Edelman, and Moore, 2015) or have dealt with governance and regulatory concerns from a legal perspective (Chuen, 2015) . 2 In comparison, there has been much research related to the computer science aspects of the phenomenon (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Miller, and Goldfeder, 2016) .
This situation is unfortunate. Without a theoretical understanding of how currency competition works, we cannot answer a long list of positive and normative questions. Among the positive questions: Will a system of private money deliver price stability? Will one currency drive all others from the market? Or will several of these currencies coexist along the equilibrium path? Do private monies require a commodity backing? Will the market provide the socially optimum amount of money? Can private monies and a government-issued money compete? Can a unit of account be separated from a medium of exchange? Among the normative questions: Should governments prevent the circulation of private monies? Should governments treat private monies as currencies or as any other regular property? Should the private monies be taxed? Even more radically, now that cryptocurrencies are technically feasible, should we revisit Friedman and Schwartz 's (1986) celebrated arguments justifying the role of governments as money issuers? There are even questions relevant for entrepreneurs:
What is the best strategy to jump start the circulation of a currency? How do you maximize the seigniorage that comes from it?
To address some of these questions, we build a model of competition among privately issued fiduciary currencies. We modify the workhorse of monetary economics, the Lagos and Wright (2005) (LW) environment, by including entrepreneurs who can issue their own currencies to maximize their utility. Otherwise, the model is standard. Following LW has two important advantages. First, since the model is particularly amenable to analysis, we 1 As of July 29, 2016, besides Bitcoin, five other cryptocurrencies (Etherum, Steem, Litecoin, Ripple, and Etherum Classic) have market capitalizations over $100 million and another fifteen between $10 and $100 million. Updated numbers are reported by https://coinmarketcap.com/. Following convention, we will use Bitcoin, with a capital B, to refer to the whole payment environment, and bitcoin, with a lower case b, to denote the currency units of the payment system. See Antonopoulos (2015) for a technical introduction to Bitcoin.
2 Some exceptions are Chiu and Wong (2014) and Hendrickson, Hogan, and Luther (2016) .
can derive many insights about currency competition. Second, the use of the LW framework makes our many new results easy to compare with previous findings in the literature. 3 We highlight six of our results. First, we show that, in a competitive environment, the existence of a monetary equilibrium consistent with price stability crucially depends on the properties of the available technologies. More concretely, the shape of the cost function determines the relationship between equilibrium prices and the entrepreneur's incentive to increase his money supply. An equilibrium with stable prices exists only if the cost function associated with the production of private money is locally linear around the origin. If the cost function is strictly convex, then there is no equilibrium consistent with price stability. Thus, Hayek 's (1999) vision of a system of private monies competing among themselves to provide a stable means of exchange crucially relies on the properties of the available technologies.
Second, there exists a continuum of equilibrium trajectories with the property that the value of private monies monotonically converges to zero, even if the environment admits the existence of an equilibrium with stable prices. This result is intriguing because it shows that the self-fulfilling inflationary episodes highlighted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) and Lagos and Wright (2003) in economies with government-issued money and a money-growth rule are not an inherent feature of public monies. Private monies are also subject to selffulfilling inflationary episodes, even when they are issued by profit-maximizing, long-lived entrepreneurs who care about the future value of their monies. 4
Third, we show that although the equilibrium with stable prices Pareto dominates all other equilibria in which the value of private monies declines over time, a purely private monetary system does not provide the socially optimum quantity of money. Private money does not solve the trading frictions at the core of LW and, more generally, of essential models of money (Wallace, 2001) . Furthermore, we show that private money creation can be a socially wasteful activity. In a well-defined sense, the market fails at providing the right amount of money in ways that it does not fail at providing the right amount of other goods.
Fourth, we show that the main features of cryptocurrencies, such as the existence of an upper bound on the available supply of each brand, make privately issued money in the form of cryptocurrencies consistent with price stability in a competitive environment, even if the cost function is strictly convex. As a result, a purely private system can deliver price stability under a wide array of preferences and technologies, provided that some limit on the total circulation of private currencies is enforced by an immutable protocol. However, this allocation only partially vindicates Hayek's proposal since it does not deliver the first best.
Fifth, when we introduce a government competing with private monies, we show that currency competition creates problems for monetary policy implementation. For instance, if the supply of government money follows a money-growth rule, then it is impossible to implement an allocation with the property that the real return on money equals the rate of time preference if agents are willing to hold privately issued monies. Profit-maximizing entrepreneurs will frustrate the government's attempt to implement a positive real return on money through a deflationary process when the public is willing to hold in portfolio private currencies. To get around this problem, we study alternative policies that can simultaneously promote stability and efficiency. In particular, we study the properties of a policy rule that pegs the real value of government money. Under this alternative regime, we demonstrate that it is possible to implement an efficient allocation as the unique equilibrium outcome, which requires driving private money out of the economy. In addition, the proposed policy rule is robust to other forms of private monies, such as those issued by automata (i.e., non-profitmaximizing agents).
Our interpretation of these results is that the threat of competition from private entrepreneurs provides market discipline to any government agency involved in currency-issuing.
If the government does not provide a sufficiently "good" money, then it will have difficulties in the implementation of allocations. Even if the government is not interested in maximizing social welfare, but values the ability to select a plan of action that induces a unique equilibrium outcome, the set of equilibrium allocations satisfying unique implementation is such that any element in that set Pareto dominates any equilibrium allocation in the purely private arrangement. Because unique implementation requires driving private money out of the economy, it follows that unique implementation necessarily requires the provision of good government money.
We also consider the implementation of an efficient allocation with automaton issuers in an economy with productive capital. This is an interesting institutional arrangement because it does not require the government's taxation power to support an efficient allocation. As we will see, an efficient allocation can be the unique equilibrium outcome provided that capital is sufficiently productive.
Finally, we illustrate the implications of network effects for competition in the currencyissuing business. In particular, we show that the presence of network effects can be relevant for the welfare properties of equilibrium allocations in a competitive environment.
The careful reader might have noticed that we have used the word "entrepreneur" and not the more common "banker" to denote the issuers of private money. This linguistic turn is important. Our model highlights how the issuing of a private currency is logically separated from banking. Both tasks were historically linked for logistical reasons: banks had a central location in the network of payments that made it easy for them to introduce currency in circulation. 5 We will argue that the internet has broken the logistical barrier. The issuing of bitcoins, for instance, is done through a proof-of-work system that is independent of any banking activity (or at least of banking understood as the issuing and handling of deposits and credit). 6
This previous explanation may also address a second concern of this enlightened reader:
What are the differences between private monies issued in the past by banks (such as during the Scottish free banking experience between 1716 and 1845) and modern cryptocurrencies?
As we mentioned, a first difference is the distribution process, which is now much wider and more dispersed than before. A second difference is the possibility, through the protocols embodied in the software, of having quasi-commitment devices regarding how much money will be issued. The most famous of these devices is the 21 million bitcoins that will eventually be released. 7 We will discuss how to incorporate an automaton issuer of private money into our model to analyze this property of cryptocurrencies. Third, cryptographic techniques, such as those described in von zur Gathen (2015), make it harder to counterfeit digital currencies than traditional physical monies, minimizing a historical obstacle that private monies faced (Gorton, 1989) . Fourth, most (but not all) historical cases of private money were of commodity-backed currencies, while most cryptocurrencies are fully fiduciary.
Note that we ignore all issues related to the payment structure of cryptocurrencies, such as the blockchain, the emergence of consensus on a network, or the possibilities of Goldfinger attacks (see Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Miller, and Goldfeder 2016 for more details). While these topics are of foremost importance, they require a specific modeling strategy that falls far from the one we follow in this paper and that we feel more suited to the macroeconomic questions we focus on.
We are not the first to study private money. The literature is large and has approached the topic from many angles. At the risk of being highly selective, we build on the tradition of Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999, 2005) , Wallace (1999), Williamson (1999) , Berentsen (2006) , and Monnet (2006) . See, as well, from a very different methodolog-5 In this respect, our analysis can be viewed as also belonging to the literature on the provision of liquidity by productive firms (Holmström and Tirole, 2011; Dang, Gorton, Holmström, and Ordoñez, 2014; and Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck, 2016) . 6 Similarly, some of the community currencies that have achieved a degree of success do not depend on banks backing or issuing them (see Greco, 2001) . 7 We use the term "quasi-commitment" because the software code can be changed by sufficient consensus in the network. This possibility is not appreciated enough in the discussion about open-source cryptocurrencies. For the importance of commitment, see Araujo and Camargo (2008) . ical perspective, Selgin and White (1994) . As previously mentioned, our emphasis is different from that in these previous papers, as we depart from modeling banks and their reserve management problem. Our entrepreneurs issue fiduciary money that cannot be redeemed for any other asset. Our characterization captures the technical features of most cryptocurrencies, which are purely fiduciary (in fact, since the cryptocurrencies cannot be used to pay taxes in most sovereigns, their existence makes them more resilient than government-issued fiat monies that are usually granted the status of legal tender). Our partial vindication of Hayek shares many commonalities with Martin and Schreft (2006) , who were the first to prove the existence of equilibria for environments in which outside money is issued competitively.
Lastly, we cannot forget Klein (1974) and his application of industrial organization insights to competition among monies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model. Section 3 characterizes the properties of a purely private arrangement. Motivated by institutional features of cryptocurrencies, we investigate, in Section 4, the implications of an exogenous bound on the supply of private currencies. Section 5 studies the interaction between private and government monies and defines the role of monetary policy in a competitive environment.
Section 6 considers money issued by automata. In Section 7, we study the welfare properties of an economy with productive capital. Section 8 illustrates the implications of network effects for currency competition. Section 9 concludes.
Model
The economy consists of a large number of buyers and sellers, with a [0, 1]-continuum of each type, and a finite number of entrepreneurs. Each period is divided into two subperiods.
In the first subperiod, all types interact in a centralized market (CM) where a perishable good, referred to as the CM good, is produced and consumed. Buyers and sellers can produce the CM good by using a linear technology that requires effort as input. All agents want to consume the CM good.
In the second subperiod, buyers and sellers interact in a decentralized market (DM) characterized by pairwise meetings, with entrepreneurs remaining idle. In particular, a buyer is randomly matched with a seller with probability σ ∈ (0, 1) and vice versa. In the DM, buyers want to consume, but cannot produce, whereas sellers are able to produce, but do not want to consume. A seller is able to produce a perishable good, referred to as the DM good, using a divisible technology that delivers one unit of the good for each unit of effort he exerts. An entrepreneur is neither a producer nor a consumer of the DM good.
Entrepreneurs are endowed with a technology to create differentiated tokens, which can take either a physical or an electronic form. Even if the tokens are differentiated (for example, each has a different "seal" or "digital signature" ), all of them are intrinsically worthless.
Let c : R + → R + denote the cost function associated with minting tokens. Assume that c : R + → R + is strictly increasing and weakly convex, with c (0) = 0. The essential feature of the tokens is that their authenticity can be publicly verified at zero cost (for example, thanks to the application of cryptography techniques), so that counterfeiting will not be an issue.
This technology will permit entrepreneurs to issue tokens that can circulate as a medium of exchange.
Let us now explicitly describe preferences. Start with a typical buyer. Let x b t ∈ R denote net consumption of the CM good, and let q t ∈ R + denote consumption of the DM good. A buyer's preferences are represented by
The utility function u : R + → R is continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave, with u (0) = ∞ and u (0) = 0. Consider now a typical seller. Let x s t ∈ R denote net consumption of the CM good, and let n t ∈ R + denote the seller's effort level to produce the DM good. A seller's preferences are represented by
Assume that w : R + → R + is continuously differentiable, increasing, and weakly convex, with w (0) = 0. Let x i t ∈ R + denote entrepreneur i's consumption of the CM good, and let ∆ i t ∈ R + denote the production of type-i tokens, with i ∈ {1, ..., N }. Entrepreneur i has preferences represented by
Finally, let β ∈ (0, 1) denote the discount factor, which is common across all types.
Throughout the analysis, we assume that buyers and sellers are anonymous (i.e., their identities are unknown and their trading histories are privately observable), which precludes credit in the decentralized market. In contrast, an entrepreneur's trading history is publicly observable (i.e., an entrepreneur is endowed with a record-keeping technology that permits him to reveal costlessly his trading history). As we will argue below, public knowledge of an entrepreneur's trading history will permit the circulation of private currencies.
Competitive Money Supply
Because the meetings in the DM are anonymous, there is no scope for trading future promises in this market. As a result, a medium of exchange is essential to achieve allocations that we could not achieve without it. In a typical monetary model, a medium of exchange is supplied in the form of a government-issued fiat money, with the government following a monetary policy rule (e.g., a money-growth rule). Also, all agents in the economy can observe the money supply at each date. These features allow agents to form beliefs about the exchange value of money in the current and future periods.
We start our analysis by considering the possibility of a purely private monetary arrangement. In particular, we focus on a system in which entrepreneurs issue intrinsically worthless tokens that circulate as a medium of exchange, attaining a strictly positive value. For this reason, we will refer to these tokens as currencies. It is important to emphasize that these privately issued currencies are not associated with any promise to exchange them for goods or other assets at some future date. Because the currency issued by an entrepreneur is nonfalsifiable and an entrepreneur's trading history is publicly observable, all agents can verify the total amount put into circulation by any individual issuer.
Profit maximization will determine the money supply in the economy. Since all agents know that an entrepreneur enters the currency-issuing business to maximize profits, one can describe individual behavior by solving the entrepreneur's optimization problem in the market for private currencies. These predictions about individual behavior allow agents to form beliefs regarding the exchange value of private currencies, given the observability of individual issuances. In other words, profit maximization in a private money arrangement serves the same purpose as the monetary policy rule in the case of a government monopoly on currency issue. Thus, it is possible to conceive a system in which privately issued currencies can attain a positive exchange value.
We can think of each entrepreneur as manufacturing a monetary unit with its own brand ("ducats," "florins,"...). In the context of cryptocurrencies, we can re-interpret the entrepreneurs as "miners" and the index i ∈ {1, ..., N } as the name of each cryptocurrency. In that interpretation, and for simplicity, we assume that there is only one miner per cryptocurrency who behaves parametrically and, hence, entrepreneur i means a miner of cryptocurrency i. The miners are willing to solve a complicated problem that requires real inputs, such as computational resources, programming effort, and electricity, to get the new electronic tokens as specified by the protocol of each cryptocurrency (we will revisit later the case where the issuing of cryptocurrencies is pinned down by an automaton). But, regardless of the interpretation we give to our framework, let φ i t ∈ R + denote the value of a unit of currency i ∈ {1, ..., N } in terms of the CM good and let φ t = φ 1 t , ..., φ N t ∈ R N + denote the vector of real prices.
Buyer
Let us start by describing the portfolio problem of a typical buyer. Let W b M b t−1 , t denote the value function for a buyer who starts period t holding a portfolio M b t−1 ∈ R N + of privately issued currencies in the CM, and let V b M b t , t denote the value function in the DM. The Bellman equation can be written as
The vector M b t ∈ R N + describes the buyer's monetary portfolio after trading in the CM, and x b t ∈ R denotes net consumption of the CM good. With simple algebra, the value function
with the intercept given by
The value for a buyer holding a portfolio M b t in the DM is given by
Note that buyers and sellers can use any currency they want without any restriction beyond respecting the terms of trade.
The standard approach in the search-theoretic literature determines the terms of trade by using Nash bargaining. Lagos and Wright (2005) demonstrate that Nash bargaining can result in a holdup problem, leading to inefficient trading activity in the DM. Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007) consider alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions and conclude that the properties of these solutions matter for the efficiency of monetary equilibrium. To avoid inefficiencies arising from the choice of the bargaining protocol, which may complicate the interpretation of the main results in the paper, we assume the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. 8
With take-it-or-leave-it offers, the buyer chooses the amount of the DM good, represented by q ∈ R + , the seller is supposed to produce and the vector of currencies, represented by d ∈ R N + , to be transferred to the seller to maximize expected surplus in the DM. Formally, the terms of trade (q, d) are determined by solving max (q,d) 
and the buyer's liquidity constraint
Let q * ∈ R + denote the quantity satisfying u (q * ) = w (q * ). Note that q * is the surplusmaximizing quantity determining the efficient level of production in the DM. The solution to the buyer's problem is given by
. Note that the solution to the bargaining problem allows us to characterize real expenditures in the DM, given by φ t+1 · d M b t ,t , as a function of the buyer's portfolio, with the composition of the basket of currencies transferred to the seller remaining indeterminate.
The indeterminacy of the portfolio of currencies transferred to the seller in the DM is reminiscent of Kareken and Wallace (1981) . These authors have established that, in the absence of portfolio restrictions and barriers to trade, the exchange rate between two currencies is indeterminate in a flexible-price economy. In our framework, a similar result holds with respect to privately issued currencies, given the absence of transaction costs when dealing with different currencies. Buyers and sellers do not "prefer" any currency over another and there is a sense in which we can talk about perfect competition among currencies. This allows us to assume that all agents behave parametrically with respect to the sequence of prices {φ t } ∞ t=0 . 9 Given the previously derived solution to the bargaining problem, the value function
. The optimal portfolio problem can be defined as max
The optimal choice, then, satisfies
for every type i ∈ {1, ..., N }, together with the transversality condition
where L : R + → R + is given by
In other words: in an equilibrium with multiple currencies, the expected return on money must be equalized across all valued currencies. In the absence of portfolio restrictions, an agent is willing to hold in portfolio two alternative currencies only if they yield the same rate of return, given that these assets are equally useful in facilitating exchange in the DM.
Seller
Let W s M s t−1 , t denote the value function for a seller who enters period t holding a portfolio M s t−1 ∈ R N + of privately issued currencies in the CM, and let V s (M s t , t) denote the value function in the DM. The Bellman equation can be written as
subject to the budget constraint
the entrepreneur i's net circulation of newly minted tokens in period t (or the mining of new cryptocurrency), as:
where M i −1 ∈ R + denotes the initial stock of type-i tokens. We will show momentarily that ∆ i t ≥ 0. Therefore, the entrepreneur's budget constraint can be written as
Here M ij t ∈ R + denotes entrepreneur i's holdings of currency issued by entrepreneur j = i. This budget constraint indicates that privately issued currencies are not associated with an explicit promise by the issuers to exchange them for goods or assets at a future date.
.., N }, then entrepreneur i chooses not to hold other currencies across periods so that M ij t = 0 for all j = i. Thus, we can rewrite the budget constraint as
which just tells us that the entrepreneur's consumption in period t is equal to the real value of the net circulation. Because x i at all dates. As we have seen, M s t = 0 so that the market-clearing condition reduces to
We can now provide a formal definition of equilibrium under a purely private monetary arrangement.
We start our analysis by investigating whether a monetary equilibrium consistent with price stability exists in the presence of currency competition. Subsequently, we turn to the welfare properties of equilibrium allocations to investigate whether an efficient allocation can be the outcome of competition in the currency-issuing business. In what follows, it is helpful to provide a broad definition of price stability to evaluate the positive properties of private currencies.
Definition 2 We say that a monetary equilibrium is consistent with price stability if
for at least one currency i ∈ {1, ..., N }.
We also provide a stronger definition of price stability that requires the price level to stabilize after a finite date.
Definition 3 We say that a monetary equilibrium is consistent with strong price stability if
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption to guarantee a well-defined demand schedule for real balances.
Assumption 1 u (q) /w (q) is strictly decreasing for all q < q * and lim q→0 u (q) /w (q) =
∞.
A property of equilibrium allocations under a competitive regime is that profit maximization establishes a positive relationship between the real price of currency i and the additional amount put into circulation by entrepreneur i when the cost function is strictly convex. The following result shows an important implication of this relation.
Lemma 4 Suppose that c :
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that lim t→∞ φ i t = 0. Because c : R + → R + is strictly convex, the entrepreneur's profit-maximization problem has an interior solution characterized by the first-order condition
Because c (0) = 0, it follows that ∆ * ,i t converges to zero as φ i t approaches zero from above.
(⇒) Suppose that lim t→∞ ∆ * ,i t = 0. Then, we must have lim t→∞ φ i t = 0 to satisfy condition (4) at all dates. To verify this claim, suppose that lim
The previous proposition highlights that the main problem of a monetary system with competitive issuers is that the supply of each brand becomes unbounded when the cost function is strictly convex: Private entrepreneurs always have an incentive to mint just a little bit more of the currency. But then one cannot have a stable value of privately issued currencies, given that such stability would eventually lead to the violation of the transversality condition. Friedman (1959) arrived at the same conclusion when arguing that a purely private system of fiduciary currencies would necessarily lead to instability in the price level. Thus, our formal analysis of currency competition confirms Friedman's conjecture.
This prediction of the model is in sharp contrast to the conclusions reached in Hayek (1999) .
Hayek argued that private agents through markets can achieve desirable outcomes, even in the field of money and banking. According to his view, government intervention is not necessary for the establishment of a monetary system consistent with price stability. The previous proposition formally shows that Hayek's conjecture does not hold in an environment with a strictly convex cost function.
Our next step is to verify whether other cost functions can be consistent with price stability. Precisely, we want to characterize sufficient conditions for price stability. We now establish that currency competition can deliver price stability when the cost function is weakly convex. In particular, the following result shows that Hayek's conjecture holds when the cost function is locally linear around the origin.
Proposition 2 Suppose that c :
Then, there is a monetary equilibrium consistent with strong price stability provided the neighborhood [0, ∆ ] is sufficiently large.
Proof. Because c :
with ∆ * ,i 0 =∆ i and ∆ * ,i t = 0 for all t ≥ 1. Given the real price φ i t = k, the previously described sequence is consistent with profit maximization provided∆ i ≤ ∆ . Then, we must have M i t =∆ i at each date t ≥ 0. Finally, it is possible to select a vector∆ = ∆ 1 , ...,∆ N satisfying
with the quantityq given by
The previous result shows how we can construct a monetary equilibrium consistent with our strong definition of price stability when the cost function is locally linear around the origin. In this equilibrium, agents do not expect monetary conditions to vary over time so that the real value of private currencies, as well as their expected return, remains constant.
The previous result, therefore, provides a partial vindication of Hayek (1999) . A purely private arrangement can deliver price stability for a strict subset of production technologies.
Our next result shows that, for the same subset of production technologies, other allocations with undesirable properties can also be consistent with the equilibrium conditions. These equilibria are characterized by the persistently declining purchasing power of private money and falling trading activity. There is no reason to forecast that the equilibrium with stable value will prevail over these different equilibria.
Proposition 3 Suppose that c :
Then, there exists a continuum of equilibria with the property that, for each i ∈ {1, ..., N },
converges monotonically to zero.
Proof. Because c : R + → R + is locally linear in a neighborhood 0,∆ ⊂ R + , there is k > 0 such that c (∆) = k∆ for all ∆ ∈ 0,∆ . Set φ i 0 = k. Then, any value ∆ i ∈ 0,∆ is consistent with profit maximization at date 0. The optimal portfolio choice implies φ i t+1 = γ t+1 φ i t at all dates t ≥ 0, with γ t+1 ∈ R + representing the common return across all valued monetary assets between dates t and t + 1. Given that
provided βγ t z (γ t ) < w (q * ) and γ t ≤ 1. Since 0 is a fixed point of the implicitly defined mapping (7), it is possible to select a sufficiently small initial value γ 1 < 1 such that the price
For any initial condition within a neighborhood of zero, there exists an associated equilibrium trajectory that is monotonically decreasing. Along this equilibrium path, real money balances decrease monotonically over time and converge to zero, so the equilibrium allocation approaches autarky as t → ∞. The decline in the desired amount of real balances follows from the agent's optimization problem when the value of privately issued currencies persistently depreciates over time (i.e., the anticipated decline in the purchasing power of private money leads agents to reduce their real money balances over time). As a result, trading activity in the decentralized market monotonically declines along the equilibrium trajectory.
This property of equilibrium allocations with privately issued currencies implies that private money is inherently unstable in that changes in beliefs can lead to undesirable self-fulfilling inflationary episodes.
The existence of these inflationary equilibrium trajectories in a purely private monetary arrangement implies that hyperinflationary episodes are not an exclusive property of government-issued money. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) build economies that can display selffulfilling inflationary episodes when the government is the sole issuer of currency and follows a money-growth rule. Lagos and Wright (2003) show that search-theoretic monetary models with government-supplied currency can also have self-fulfilling inflationary episodes under a money-growth rule. Our analysis of privately issued currencies shows that self-fulfilling inflationary equilibria can occur in the absence of government currency when private agents enter the currency-issuing business to maximize profits. Thus, replacing government monopoly under a money-growth rule with profit maximization does not overcome the fundamental fragility associated with fiduciary regimes, public or private.
To conclude this section, we want to show the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium with the property that a unique private currency circulates in the economy, despite free entry. This occurs because the market share across different types of money is indeterminate.
Then, there exists a monetary equilibrium satisfying b 1 t = b > 0 and b i t = 0 for all i ≥ 2 at all dates t ≥ 0.
Proof. The market-clearing condition implies
with γ t+1 ∈ R + representing the common return across all valued monetary assets between dates t and t + 1. Note that b j t = 0 implies either φ j t = 0 or M j t = 0, or both. If we set b i t = 0 for all i ≥ 2, then the market-clearing condition implies b 1 t = z γ t+1 . Following the same steps as in the proof of the previous proposition, it is possible to show that there exists an equilibrium with b 1 t = z (1) > 0 and b i t = 0 for all i ≥ 2 at all dates t ≥ 0.
In these equilibria, a single entrepreneur becomes the sole issuer of currency in the economy. The threat of entry constrains his behavior and market participants understand the discipline imposed by free entry, even though all agents see a single private agent supplying all currency in the economy. As in the previous case, an equilibrium with a stable value of money is as likely to occur as an equilibrium with a declining value of money.
Welfare Properties
To simplify our welfare analysis, we consider the solution to the planner's problem when the economy is initially endowed with a strictly positive amount of tokens. In our framework, these durable objects serve as a record-keeping device that allows the planner to implement allocations with positive trade in the DM, even though the actions in each bilateral meeting are privately observable and agents cannot commit to their promises. Thanks to the existence of an initial positive amount of tokens, the planner does not need to use the costly technology to mint tokens to serve as a record-keeping device in decentralized transactions. 11
In this case, any solution to the social planner's problem is characterized by the surplusmaximizing quantity q * in the DM. Following the same steps as in Rocheteau (2012) , it can be demonstrated that a social planner with access to lump-sum taxes in the CM can implement the first-best allocation (i.e., the allocation the planner would choose in an environment with perfect record-keeping and full commitment) by systematically removing tokens from
circulation.
An immediate implication of this result is that the equilibrium with stable prices is not socially efficient. In this equilibrium, the quantity traded in the DMq satisfies
which is below the socially efficient quantity (i.e.,q < q * ). Although the allocation associated with the equilibrium with stable prices is not efficient, it Pareto dominates the nonstationary equilibria described in Proposition 3. To verify this claim, note that the quantity traded in the DM starts from a value belowq and decreases monotonically in an inflationary equilibrium.
Another important implication of the characterization of efficient allocations is that the persistent creation of tokens along the equilibrium path is a socially wasteful activity. Given an initial supply of tokens, the planner can implement an efficient allocation by systematically removing tokens from circulation so that the production of additional tokens is unnecessary.
Because the creation of tokens is socially costly, any allocation involving a production plan that implies a growing supply of tokens is necessarily inefficient. Recall that entrepreneurs have an incentive to mint additional units of tokens when these objects are positively valued in equilibrium. From a social perspective, the planner wants to avoid the excessive creation of tokens so that there is scope for public policies that aim at preventing overissue. We will return to this issue later in the paper.
In equilibrium, a necessary condition for efficiency is to have the real rate of return on money equal to the rate of time preference. In this case, there is no opportunity cost of holding money balances for transaction purposes so that the socially efficient quantity q * is traded in every bilateral match in the DM. Because a necessary condition for efficient is to have a strictly positive real return on money in equilibrium, the following result implies that a socially efficient allocation cannot be implemented as an equilibrium outcome in a purely private arrangement.
Proposition 5 There is no monetary equilibrium with a strictly positive real return on money.
Proof. Note that the law of motion for currency i ∈ {1, ..., N } implies
where γ t ∈ R + represents the common real return across all valued currencies. Then, we can derive the following relation
at all dates, where the function z : R + → R + is given by
Given the previously derived equilibrium relations, it is possible to obtain the following condition:
It is straightforward to show that the market-clearing condition is necessarily violated when (8) is violated and vice versa.
Suppose that there is a date T ≥ 0 such that γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T . Because the right-hand side of (8) must be nonnegative, we must have γ t+1 > γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T . In addition, there exists a lower boundγ > 1 such that γ t ≥γ for all t ≥ T .
We claim that the sequence
is strictly increasing and bounded, it must converge to a finite limit. Then, we must have
is an equilibrium relation, we obtain a contradiction. Hence, we conclude that the price sequence φ i t ∞ t=0 must be unbounded. Suppose the cost function c : R + → R + is strictly convex. Then, we have an interior solution ∆ * ,i t > 0 when φ i t > 0. Define the value
where the maximization on the right-hand side is subject to βγz (γ) ≤ w (q * ) and βγ + z γ + ≤ w (q * ). It is clear that 0 ≤ Γ < ∞.
given that the sequence φ i t ∞ t=0 is strictly increasing and unbounded. But this implies that condition (8) is violated. As a result, we cannot have an equilibrium with the property that γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T , given an arbitrary finite date T ≥ 0.
Suppose now that the cost function c : R + → R + is locally linear around the origin. Given that φ i t ∞ t=0 is strictly increasing and unbounded, there exists a date 0 ≤ T < ∞ such that ∆ * ,i t > 0 for all t ≥ T . Then, condition (8) is necessarily violated at a finite date. Finally, assume that the cost function c :
At that date, the entrepreneur's profit-maximization problem has no solution.
An immediate corollary from the previous proposition is that a purely private monetary system does not provide the socially optimum quantity of money, as defined in Friedman (1969) . This result is central to our paper: Despite having entrepreneurs that take prices parametrically, competition cannot provide an optimal outcome because entrepreneurs do not internalize the pecuniary externalities they create in the decentralized market by minting additional tokens. These pecuniary externalities mean that, at a fundamental level, the market for currencies is very different from the market for goods such as wheat, and the forces that drive optimal outcomes under perfect competition in the latter fail in the former. 12
Limited Supply
In the previous section, entrepreneurs could mint as much new currency as they wanted in each period. However, in reality, the protocol behind most cryptocurrencies sets up an upper bound on the supply of each brand. Motivated by this observation, we extent our model to investigate the consequences of such bounds. In this section, we interpret the entrepreneurs as "miners" of cryptocurrencies that solve a complicated problem that requires real inputs, such as computational resources, programming effort, and electricity, to get the new electronic tokens as specified by the protocol of each cryptocurrency.
Assume that there is a cap on the amount of each cryptocurrency that can be mined at each date. Formally, let∆ i t ∈ R + denote the date-t cap on cryptocurrency i ∈ {1, ..., N }. In this case, the miner's profit maximization problem is given by
Then, we can define a monetary equilibrium in the same way as before by replacing (4) with (9).
The following result establishes that it is possible to have a monetary equilibrium consistent with our stronger definition of price stability when the protocol behind each cryptocurrency imposes an upper bound on total circulation, even if the cost function is strictly convex.
Proposition 6 Suppose L (A) + AL (A) > 0 for all A > 0. Then, there is a class of caps ∆ t ∞ t=0 such that a monetary equilibrium consistent with strong price stability is shown to exist. These caps are such that∆ i t > 0 at dates 0 ≤ t ≤ T and∆ i t = 0 at all subsequent dates t ≥ T + 1, given a finite date T > 0.
Proof. Consider a set of caps with the property that∆ i t > 0 at dates 0 ≤ t ≤ T and ∆ i t = 0 at all subsequent dates t ≥ T + 1, given a finite date T > 0. For each i, set φ i t =φ at all dates t ≥ T + 1, with the constantφ > 0 satisfying
For any date t ≤ T , the values {φ 0 , ..., φ T } satisfy
where M i 0 =∆ i 0 and M i t =∆ i t + M i t−1 at any date 1 ≤ t ≤ T . We can rewrite (11) as
As a result, the partial sequence {φ 0 , ..., φ T } can be constructed from (11), given the exogenous
. The final step in the proof is to select each cap∆ i t in such a way that it is consistent with profit maximization at the price φ t . Note that (10) implies ∂φ/∂∆ i t < 0. Because φ T =φ, we have ∂φ T /∂∆ i t < 0. At date T − 1, we have
for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and
Because L (A) + AL (A) > 0 for all A > 0, we conclude that ∂φ T −1 /∂∆ i t < 0 for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Following the same steps, one can show that every element in the sequence {φ 0 , ..., φ T } satisfying (11) is strictly decreasing in∆ i t for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Then, it is possible to select a sufficiently low value for the caps ∆ i 0 ,∆ i 1 , ...,∆ i T N i=1 such that the constraint ∆ ≤∆ i t in the optimization problem on the right-hand side of (9) is binding. In this case, we have ∆ * ,i t =∆ i t at all dates.
In the previously described allocation, the value of money and trading activity stabilize after date T . Thus, it is possible to have price stability with a strictly convex cost function when the protocol behind cryptocurrencies limits the amount of each privately issued currency. In this respect, the innovations associated with cryptocurrencies and their immutable protocols can provide an effective mechanism to make a purely private arrangement consistent with price stability in the absence of government intervention. 13
Although the existence of an upper bound on currency issue can promote price stability in a competitive environment, it does not imply efficiency. The previously made arguments regarding the reasons for not achieving efficiency through a market arrangement continue to hold even if innovations in the field of computer science permit the implementation of exogenous bounds on the supply of cryptocurrencies. In view of the inefficiency of a private system, we turn to the study of the role of monetary policy in a competitive environment.
Monetary Policy
In this section, we study the role of monetary policy in the presence of privately issued currencies. As we have seen, a central result of our previous analysis is that there is no efficient equilibrium under a purely private arrangement. The competition process does not provide the incentives to deliver the socially optimal return on money and results in socially wasteful money creation. In what follows, we want to investigate whether it is possible to implement the socially optimal return on money by introducing government money and monetary policy.
If so, we move on to provide sufficient conditions for efficiency.
Suppose the government enters the currency-issuing business by creating its own brand, referred to as currency N + 1. In this case, the government budget constraint is given by
where τ t ∈ R is the real value of lump-sum taxes, φ N +1 t ∈ R + is the real value of governmentissued currency, and ∆ N +1 t ∈ R is the amount of the government brand issued at date t.
What makes government money fundamentally different from private money is that behind the government brand there is a fiscal authority with the power to tax agents in the economy.
Government money follows the law of motion
at all dates, given an initial condition M N +1
The definition of equilibrium in the presence of government money is the same as before except that the vectors M t , M b t , and φ t are now elements in R N +1 + and the scalar sequence
is exogenously given. A formal definition is now provided.
Definition 5 A perfect-foresight monetary equilibrium is an array
satisfying (2)-(6) and (12) for each i ∈ {1, ..., N } at all dates t ≥ 0.
Given Assumption 1, L (A) is invertible in the range 0, β −1 w (q * ) so that we can define
where γ t ∈ R + represents the common real return across all valued currencies. The previous relation describes the demand for real balances as a function of the real return on money.
At this point, it makes sense to restrict attention to preferences and technologies that imply an empirically plausible money demand function satisfying the property that the demand for real balances is decreasing in the inflation rate (i.e., increasing in the real return on money). In particular, it is helpful to make the following additional assumption.
Assumption 2 Suppose z : R + → R + is strictly increasing.
In any equilibrium with valued government money, we must have
at all dates t ≥ 0. In the absence of portfolio restrictions, government money must yield the same rate of return as other monetary assets for it to be valued in equilibrium.
Money-growth rule
We start our analysis of a hybrid arrangement by assuming that the government follows a money-growth rule of the form
with the money growth rate satisfying ω ≥ β − 1 (otherwise, we would not have an equilibrium). Given this policy rule, we move on to derive a crucial property of the hybrid monetary system. As we have seen, a necessary condition for efficient is to have the real return on money equal to the rate of time preference. Thus, the socially optimal return on money is necessarily positive. The following proposition shows that it is impossible to have a monetary equilibrium with a positive real return on money and positively valued privately issued money.
Proposition 7 There is no equilibrium with the properties that (i) at least one private currency is valued and (ii) the real return on money is strictly positive.
Proof. The law of motion for the supply of each privately issued currency i ∈ {1, ..., N } implies the following relation
where γ t ∈ R + represents the common real return across all valued currencies. The market-
at all dates. Thus, we can derive the equilibrium relation
Consider a money-growth rule with ω ≥ 0. Then, we have ∆ N +1 t ≥ 0 at all dates. Suppose that there is a date T ≥ 0 such that γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T . Because the right-hand side of (13) must be nonnegative, we must have γ t+1 > γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T . In addition, there exists a lower boundγ > 1 such that γ t ≥γ for all t ≥ T .
Suppose the cost function c : R + → R + is strictly convex. Then, we have an interior solution ∆ * ,i t > 0 when φ i t > 0. Define the value
As previously shown, the sequence
given that ∆ N +1 t ≥ 0 holds at all dates and that the sequence φ i t ∞ t=0 is strictly increasing and unbounded. But this implies that condition (13) is violated. As previously mentioned, it is straightforward to show that the market-clearing condition is necessarily violated when condition (13) is violated and vice versa. As a result, we cannot have an equilibrium with the property that γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T , given any finite date T ≥ 0.
Suppose now that the cost function c : R + → R + is locally linear around the origin. Given that φ i t ∞ t=0 is strictly increasing and unbounded, there exists a date 0 ≤ T < ∞ such that ∆ * ,i t > 0 for all t ≥ T . Then, condition (13) is violated at a finite date. Finally, assume that the cost function c : R + → R + is linear. Then, there is k > 0 such that c (∆) = k∆ for all ∆ ≥ 0. Because γ t+1 > γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T , there is a date 0 ≤ T < ∞ such that φ i T > k. At that date, the entrepreneur's profit-maximization problem has no solution.
Consider a money growth rate ω in the interval (β − 1, 0). Then, we must have ∆ N +1 t < 0 in every period. Suppose that there is a date T ≥ 0 such that γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T . Because the left-hand side of (13) must be nonnegative, we must have γ t+1 > γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T .
Suppose the cost function c : R + → R + is strictly convex. Then, the sequence ∆ * ,i t ∞ t=0 is strictly increasing and unbounded. In this case, a monetary equilibrium can exist only if
is strictly increasing, the government money supply sequence M N +1 t ∞ t=0 must decrease at a faster rate so that the real value of government money, given by φ N +1 t M N +1 t , is strictly decreasing. Because the real value of government money cannot fall below zero and the term N i=1 φ i t ∆ * ,i t is unbounded, we cannot have an equilibrium with γ t > 1 for all t ≥ T when ω ∈ (β − 1, 0).
When the cost function c : R + → R + is locally linear around the origin, it is straightforward to show that N i=1 φ i t ∆ * ,i t is unbounded. Finally, when the cost function is linear, one can show that the entrepreneur's profit-maximization problem has no solution at some finite date.
The intuition for the previous proposition is as follows. An equilibrium with a positive real return on money requires deflation. A deflationary process can occur along the equilibrium path only if there is a persistent contraction of the money supply. The entrepreneurs are unwilling to shrink the private money supply by retiring previously issued currency. Thus, the only option left is to have the government systematically shrinking the supply of its own brand to such an extent that the total money supply declines in every period. The previous proposition shows that this strategy becomes unsustainable at some finite date because the entrepreneurs will create an ever increasing amount of money when the government attempts to promote a deflationary process. Thus, it is impossible to have an equilibrium with deflation and a positive real return on money when private money competes with government money.
The main implication of the previous result is that the implementation of monetary policy through a money-growth rule is significantly impaired by the presence of competing currencies. Profit-maximizing entrepreneurs will frustrate the government's attempt to implement a positive real return on money through a deflationary process when the public is willing to hold private currencies. 14 Note that the proposition does not rule out the existence of equilibria with a positive real return on money. It simply says that an equilibrium with a positive real return on money and positively valued private currencies cannot exist under a money-growth rule in the presence of profit-maximizing entrepreneurs.
An immediate corollary of the previous proposition is that the socially optimal return on money can be implemented through a money-growth rule only if agents do not value privately issued currency. In particular, we can construct equilibria with the property φ i t = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., N } and φ N +1 t > 0 at all dates t ≥ 0. In these equilibria, the sequence of returns satisfies, for all dates
The dynamic properties of the system (14) are exactly the same as those derived in Lagos and Wright (2003) when preferences and technologies imply a demand function for real balances that is strictly decreasing in the inflation rate.
A policy choice ω in the range (β − 1, 0) is associated with a steady state characterized by deflation and a strictly positive real return on money. In particular, we have γ t = (1 + ω) −1 for all t ≥ 0. In this stationary equilibrium, the quantity traded in the DM, represented by 14 We should emphasize that there is nothing intrinsically superior about government money from the perspective of the agents (for example, we are not assuming that the government forces agents to pay their taxes in its own currency). q (ω), satisfies σ u (q (ω)) w (q (ω)) + 1 − σ = 1 + ω β .
If we let ω → β − 1, the associated steady state delivers an efficient allocation (i.e., q (ω) → q * as ω → β − 1). This policy prescription is the celebrated Friedman rule, which eliminates the opportunity cost of holding money balances for transaction purposes. The problem with this arrangement is that the Friedman rule is not uniquely associated with an efficient allocation. In addition to the equilibrium allocations characterized by the coexistence of private and government monies, there exists a continuum of inflationary trajectories that are also associated with the Friedman rule. These trajectories are suboptimal because they involve a persistently declining value of money.
Pegging the real value of government money
In view of the previously described issues for monetary policy implementation, we develop an alternative policy rule that can uniquely implement the socially optimal return on money.
As we will see, this outcome will require government money to drive private money out of the economy.
Consider a policy rule that pegs the real value of government money. Specifically, assume the government issues currency to satisfy the condition
at all dates for some target value m > 0. This means that the government adjusts the sequence ∆ N +1 t ∞ t=0 to satisfy (15) in every period. The following proposition establishes the main result of our analysis of currency competition under a hybrid system. It shows that it is possible to select a target value m for government policy that uniquely implements a stationary equilibrium with a strictly positive real return on money.
Proposition 8 There exists a unique stationary monetary equilibrium characterized by a constant positive real return on money provided the target value m satisfies z −1 (m) > 1 and βz −1 (m) m ≤ w (q * ). In this equilibrium, government money drives private money out of the economy Proof. When the government pegs the real value of its own money, the market-clearing condition implies
at all dates. The law of motion for the supply of each private currency implies the relation
Then, we can rewrite the market-clearing condition as
In addition, we must have z (γ t ) ≥ m and βγ t z (γ t ) ≤ w (q * ), given that φ i t ≥ 0 and M i t ≥ 0. Set the target value m such that z −1 (m) > 1. Then, we must have γ t ≥ z −1 (m) > 1 at all dates. In addition, the real return on money must satisfy
with the maximization on the right-hand side subject to z (γ) ≥ m, z γ + ≥ m, βγz (γ) ≤ w (q * ), and βγ + z γ + ≤ w (q * ). It is clear that 0 ≤ Γ (m) < ∞.
Because γ t > 1 must hold at all dates, we must have
for any valued currency in every period. This means that the price sequence φ i t ∞ t=0 is strictly increasing. Following the same reasoning as that of Proposition 4, we can show that φ i t ∞ t=0
is an unbounded sequence.
Suppose the cost function c : R + → R + is strictly convex. Then, the first-order condition for the profit maximization problem implies φ i t = c ∆ * ,i t , which means that the profitmaximizing choice ∆ * ,i t is strictly increasing in φ i t . As a result, there exists a date 0 ≤ T < ∞ such that Then, there is a finite date T ≥ 0 such that ∆ * ,i t > 0 for all t ≥ T . Because φ i t ∞ t=0 is strictly increasing and unbounded, the term N i=1 ∆ * ,i t φ i t is unbounded, which leads to the violation of the market-clearing condition.
Finally, assume that the cost function c :
is strictly increasing and unbounded, there exists a finite date T ≥ 0 such that φ i T > k. In this situation, the profit-maximization problem has no solution at date T .
Regardless of the properties of the cost function, we cannot have a monetary equilibrium with positively valued private currencies when the government sets a target value m satisfying z −1 (m) > 1 and βz −1 (m) m ≤ w (q * ). When we set the value of private currencies to zero, we obtain the equilibrium trajectory γ t = z −1 (m) at all dates t ≥ 0. This trajectory satisfies the other boundary condition because βz −1 (m) m ≤ w (q * ).
In Proposition 7, we have shown that, under a money-growth rule, there is no equilibrium with a positive real return on money and positively valued private monies, which does not rule out the existence of equilibria with a negative real return on money and valued private monies. Proposition 8 provides a stronger result regarding the coexistence of private and public monies. Specifically, it shows that an equilibrium with valued private monies does not exist when the government follows a policy rule that pegs the real value of government money, provided that the target value is sufficiently large.
The intuition behind this result is that, given the government's commitment to peg the purchasing power of money balances, a private entrepreneur needs to be willing to shrink the supply of his own brand to maintain a constant purchasing power of money balances when the value of money increases at a constant rate along the equilibrium trajectory. But profit maximization implies that an entrepreneur wants to expand his supply, not contract it. As a result, an equilibrium with valued private money cannot exist when the government pegs the purchasing power of money at a sufficiently high level. Thus, by credibly guaranteeing the real value of money balances, the government is able to uniquely implement an allocation with a positive real return on money by driving private monies out of the economy.
Another way to interpret the previous result is to acknowledge that unique implementation requires the provision of "good" government money. The policy of pegging the real value of government money can be viewed as providing good money to support exchange in the economy. Even if the government is not interested in maximizing social welfare, but values the ability to select a plan of actions that induces a unique equilibrium outcome, the set of equilibrium allocations satisfying unique implementation is such that any element in that set Pareto dominates any equilibrium allocation in the purely private arrangement. To verify this claim, note that unique implementation requires z −1 (m) > 1. Because γ t ≥ z −1 (m) must hold at all dates, it follows that the real return on money must be strictly positive in any allocation that can be uniquely implemented under the previously described policy regime.
As we have seen, private money creation can be a socially wasteful activity. Thus, an immediate societal benefit of a policy that drives private money out of the economy is to prevent the wasteful creation of tokens in the private sector.
An important corollary from the previous proposition is that one can uniquely implement the socially optimal return on money by taking the limit
In this case, the surplus-maximizing quantity q * is traded in each bilateral meeting in the DM.
To implement a target value with z −1 (m) > 1, the government must tax private agents in the CM. To verify this claim, note that the government budget constraint can be written
in every period t. Because the unique equilibrium implies γ t = z −1 (m) for all t ≥ 0, we must have τ t = m z −1 (m) − 1 > 0 at all dates t ≥ 0. To implement its target value m, the government needs to persistently contract the money supply by making purchases that exceed its sales in the CM, with the shortfall financed by taxes.
As previously mentioned, a necessary condition for efficiency is to have the real return on money equal to the rate of time preference. It remains to characterize sufficient conditions for efficiency. In particular, we want to verify whether the unique allocation associated with the policy choice m → z β −1 is socially efficient. As we have seen, the nontrivial element of the environment that makes the welfare analysis more complicated is the presence of a costly technology to manufacture durable tokens that circulate as a medium of exchange.
If the initial endowment of government money across agents is strictly positive, then it is clear that the allocation associated with m → z β −1 is socially efficient, given that the entrepreneurs are driven out of the market and the government does not use the costly technology to create additional tokens. In addition, the lump-sum tax is neutral, given quasilinear preferences.
If the initial endowment of government money is zero, then the government needs to mint an initial amount of tokens so that it can systematically shrink the available supply in subsequent periods to induce a deflationary process. Here, we run into a classical issue in monetary economics: How much money to issue initially in an environment where it is costly to mint additional units? The government would like to issue as little as possible at the initial date, given that tokens are costly to produce. In fact, the problem of determining the socially optimal initial amount has no solution in the presence of divisible money. Despite this issue, it is clear that, after the initial date, the equilibrium allocation is socially efficient.
In this section, we have demonstrated that the joint goal of monetary stability and efficiency can be achieved by public policy provided the government is able to tax private agents to guarantee a sufficiently large value of its money supply. The implementation of the socially optimal return on money requires government money to drive private money out of the economy, which also avoids the socially wasteful production of tokens in the private sector.
Automata
In the previous section, we have shown that the government is able to drive private money out of the economy by pegging the real value of its own currency brand. As we have seen, the entrepreneurs' profit-maximizing behavior plays a central role in the construction of the results. In this section, we want to show that the previously described policy rule is robust to other forms of private money, such as those issued by automata.
Consider the benchmark economy described in Section 3 without profit-maximizing entrepreneurs. Add to that economy J automata, each programmed to maintain a constant amount H j ∈ R + of tokens. Let h j t ≡ φ j t H j denote the real value of the tokens issued by automaton j ∈ {1, ..., J} and let h t ∈ R J + denote the vector of real values. If the units issued by automaton j are valued in equilibrium, then we must have 
for all t ≥ 0. Given these conditions, we can now provide a definition of equilibrium in the presence of automata under the policy of pegging the real value of government money.
satisfying (12), (15), (17), (18), h j t ≥ 0 , z (γ t ) ≥ m, and βγ t z (γ t ) ≤ w (q * ) for all t ≥ 0 and j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
The previous proposition shows that an equilibrium can be described by a sequence {γ t } ∞ t=0 satisfying the dynamic system
together with the boundary conditions z (γ t ) ≥ m and βγ t z (γ t ) ≤ w (q * ). We want to show that the properties of the dynamic system depend on the value of the policy parameter m. Precisely, the previously described system is a transcritical bifurcation. 15 To illustrate this property, it is helpful to consider the functional forms u (q) = (1 − η) −1 q 1−η and w (q) =
(1 + α) −1 q 1+α , with 0 < η < 1 and α ≥ 0. In this case, the equilibrium evolution of the real return on money satisfies the conditions
at all dates t ≥ T . Condition (20) imposes a lower bound on the equilibrium return on money, which can result in the existence of a steady state at the lower bound.
It is helpful to further simplify the dynamic system by assuming that α = 0 (linear disutility of production) and σ → 1 (no matching friction in the decentralized market). In this case, the equilibrium evolution of the return on money γ t satisfies the law of motion
and the boundary condition
The policy parameter can take on any value in the interval 0 ≤ m ≤ 1. Also, the real value of the money supply remains above the lower bound m at all dates. Given that the government provides a credible lower bound for the real value of the money supply due to its taxation power, the return on money is bounded below by a strictly positive constant β −1 m along the equilibrium path.
We can obtain a steady state by solving the polynomial equation
If m = β, the roots are 1 and β −1 m. If m = β, the unique solution is 1. As we will see, the properties of the dynamic system differ considerably depending on the value of the policy parameter m.
If 0 < m < β, then there exist two steady states: γ t = β −1 m and γ t = 1 for all t ≥ 0.
The steady state γ t = 1 for all t ≥ 0 corresponds to the previously described stationary equilibrium with constant prices. The steady state γ t = β −1 m for all t ≥ 0 is an equilibrium with the property that only government money is valued, which is globally stable. There exists a continuum of equilibrium trajectories starting from any point γ 0 ∈ β −1 m, 1 with the property that the return on money converges to β −1 m. Along these trajectories, the value of money declines monotonically to the lower bound m and government money drives private money out of the economy.
If m = β, the unique steady state is γ t = 1 for all t ≥ 0. In this case, the 45-degree line is the tangent line to the graph of (21) at the point (1, 1), so the dynamic system remains above the 45-degree line. When we introduce the boundary restriction (22), we find that γ t = 1 for all t ≥ 0 is the unique equilibrium trajectory. Thus, the policy choice m = β results in global determinacy, with the unique equilibrium outcome characterized by price stability.
If β < m < 1, the unique steady state is γ t = β −1 m for all t ≥ 0. Setting the target for the value of government money in the interval β < m < 1 results in a sustained deflation to ensure that the real return on money remains above one. To implement a sustained deflation, the government must contract its money supply, a policy financed through taxation.
Productive Capital
The goal of this section is to investigate whether it is possible to implement an efficient allocation in the absence of government intervention if we introduce productive capital in the economy. In what follows, we show that productive capital does not change the set of implementable allocations in the economy with profit-maximizing entrepreneurs, a direct consequence of the entrepreneur's linear utility function. On the other hand, we will demonstrate that, with automaton issuers, it is possible to implement an efficient allocation in the absence of government intervention provided that the automaton issuers have access to sufficiently productive capital.
Profit-Maximizing Entrepreneurs
automaton j ∈ {1, ..., J} and let h t ∈ R J + denote the vector of real values. Also, let f t ∈ R J + denote the vector of real dividends. The market-clearing condition in the money market is given by
for all t ≥ 0. For each automaton j, we can rewrite the budget constraint (23) as
Given these changes in the environment, we can now provide a formal definition of equilibrium under an institutional arrangement with the property that automaton issuers have access to productive capital.
Definition 7 Given a predetermined dividend plan {f t } ∞ t=0 , a perfect-foresight monetary equilibrium is a sequence {h t , γ t } ∞ t=0 satisfying (24), (25), h j t ≥ 0, z (γ t ) ≥ 0, and βγ t z (γ t ) ≤ w (q * ) for all t ≥ 0 and j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
It remains to verify whether a particular set of dividend plans can be consistent with an efficient allocation. An obvious candidate for an efficient dividend plan is the constant sequence f j t = f J for all j ∈ {1, ..., J} at all dates t ≥ 0, with 0 ≤ f ≤ κ. In this case, we obtain the dynamic system:
with z (γ t ) ≥ 0 and βγ t z (γ t ) ≤ w (q * ). The following proposition establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium allocation with the property that the real return on money is strictly positive.
Proposition 10 Suppose u (q) = (1 − η) −1 q 1−η and w (q) = (1 + α) −1 q 1+α , with 0 < η < 1 and α ≥ 0. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium allocation with the property γ t = γ s for all t ≥ 0 and 1 < γ s ≤ β −1 .
Proof. Given the functional forms u (q) = (1 − η) −1 q 1−η and w (q) = (1 + α) −1 q 1+α , with 0 < η < 1 and α ≥ 0, the dynamic system (26) reduces to
It can be easily shown that dγ t+1 /dγ t > 0 for all γ t > 0. When γ t+1 = 0, we have
Because γ t ∈ 0, β −1 for all t ≥ 0, a nonstationary solution would violate the boundary condition. Thus, the unique solution is necessarily stationary, γ t = γ s for all t ≥ 0, and must
Our next step is to show that the unique equilibrium is socially efficient if the real dividend κ > 0 is sufficiently large. To demonstrate this result, it is helpful to further simplify the dynamic system by assuming that η = 1 2 and α = 0. In addition, take the limit σ → 1. In this case, the dynamic system reduces to
whereκ ≡ κ − f . The unique fixed point in the range 0, β −1 is
> 0 for all γ > 0 and 0 = g β −1κ , it follows that γ t = γ s for all t ≥ 0 is the unique equilibrium trajectory. As we can see, the real return on money is strictly positive. If we take the limit
we find that the unique equilibrium approaches the socially efficient allocation. Thus, it is possible to uniquely implement an efficient allocation in the absence of government taxation if the stock of real assets is sufficiently productive to finance the deflationary process associated with the Friedman rule.
The results derived in this subsection bear some resemblance to those of Andolfatto, Berentsen, and Waller (2016) , who study the properties of a monetary arrangement in which an institution with the monopoly rights on the economy's physical capital issues claims that circulate as a medium of exchange. Both analyses confirm that the implementation of an efficient allocation does not necessarily rely on the government's taxation power if private agents have access to productive assets.
Network Effects
Many discussions of currency competition highlight the importance of network effects in the use of currencies. See, for example, Halaburda and Sarvary (2015) . To evaluate these network effects, let us consider a version of the baseline model in which the economy consists of a countable infinity of identical locations indexed by j ∈ {..., −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, ...}. Each location contains a [0, 1]-continuum of buyers and a [0, 1]-continuum of sellers. For simplicity, we remove the entrepreneurs from the model and assume that in each location j there is a fixed supply of N types of tokens, as in the previous section. All agents have the same preferences and technologies as previously described. In addition, we take the limit σ → 1 so that each buyer is randomly matched with a seller with probability one and vice versa.
The main change from the baseline model is that sellers move randomly across locations.
Suppose that a fraction 1 − δ of sellers in each location j is randomly selected to move to location j + 1 at each date t ≥ 0. Assume that the seller's relocation status is publicly revealed at the beginning of the decentralized market and that the actual relocation occurs after the decentralized market closes.
Suppose that each location j starts with M i > 0 units of "locally issued" currency i ∈ {1, ..., N }. We start by showing the existence of a symmetric and stationary equilibrium with the property that currency issued by an entrepreneur in location j circulates only in that location. In this equilibrium, a seller who finds out he is going to be relocated from location j to j + 1 does not produce the DM good for the buyer in exchange for local currency because he believes that currency issued in location j will not be valued in location j + 1. This belief can be self-fulfilling so that currency issued in location j circulates only in that location. In this case, the optimal portfolio choice implies the first-order condition δ u (q (M t , t)) w (q (M t , t)) + 1 − δ = 1 βγ i t+1 for each currency i. Note that we have suppressed any superscript or subscript indicating the agent's location, given that we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria. Define L δ :
Then, the demand for real balances in each location is given by
where γ t+1 denotes the common rate of return on money in a given location. Because the market-clearing condition implies
the equilibrium sequence {γ t } ∞ t=0 satisfies the law of motion z γ t+1 ; δ = γ t z (γ t ; δ) and the boundary condition βγ t z (γ t ; δ) ≤ w (q * ).
Suppose u (q) = (1 − η) −1 q 1−η and w (q) = (1 + α) −1 q 1+α , with 0 < η < 1 and α ≥ 0.
Then, the dynamic system describing the equilibrium evolution of γ t is given by
The following proposition establishes the existence of a stationary equilibrium with the property that privately issued currencies circulate locally.
Proposition 11 Suppose u (q) = (1 − η) −1 q 1−η and w (q) = (1 + α) −1 q 1+α , with 0 < η < 1 and α ≥ 0. There exists a stationary equilibrium with the property that the quantity traded in the DM is given byq (δ) ∈ (0, q * ) satisfying δ u (q (δ)) w (q (δ)) + 1 − δ = β −1 .
In addition,q (δ) is strictly increasing in δ.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the sequence γ t = 1 for all t ≥ 0 satisfies (27).
Then, the solution to the optimal portfolio problem implies that the DM output must satisfy (28). Because the term u (q) /w (q) is strictly decreasing in q, it follows that the solution q (δ) to (28) must be strictly increasing in δ.
The previously described stationary allocation is associated with price stability across all locations, but production in the DM occurs only in a fraction δ ∈ (0, 1) of all bilateral meetings. Only a seller who is not going to be relocated is willing to produce the DM good in exchange for locally issued currency. A seller who finds out he is going to be relocated does not produce in the DM because the buyer can only offer him currencies that are not valued in other locations.
Now we construct an equilibrium in which the currency initially issued by an entrepreneur in location j circulates in other locations. In a symmetric equilibrium, the same amount of type-i currency that flowed from location j to j +1 in the previous period flowed into location j as relocated sellers moved across locations. As a result, we can construct an equilibrium with the property that all sellers in a given location accept locally issued currency because they believe that these currencies will be valued in other locations.
The optimal portfolio choice implies the first-order condition u (q (M t , t)) w (q (M t , t)) = 1 βγ i t+1 for each currency i. Then, the demand for real balances in each location is given by z γ t+1 ; 1 = 1 γ t+1 L −1 1 1 βγ t+1 .
Because the market-clearing condition implies N i=1 φ i t M i = z γ t+1 ; 1 , the equilibrium sequence {γ t } ∞ t=0 satisfies the law of motion z γ t+1 ; 1 = γ t z (γ t ; 1) and the boundary condition βγ t z (γ t ; 1) ≤ w (q * ).
Then, the dynamic system describing the equilibrium evolution of γ t is
The following proposition establishes the existence of a stationary equilibrium with the property that locally issued currencies circulate in several locations.
Proposition 12 Suppose u (q) = (1 − η) −1 q 1−η and w (q) = (1 + α) −1 q 1+α , with 0 < η < 1 and α ≥ 0. There exists a stationary equilibrium with the property that the quantity traded in the DM is given byq (1) ∈ (q (δ) , q * ) satisfying u (q (1)) w (q (1)) = β −1 .
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the sequence γ t = 1 for all t ≥ 0 satisfies (29).
Then, the solution to the optimal portfolio problem implies that the DM output must satisfy (30). The quantitiesq andq (δ) satisfy u (q (1)) w (q (1)) = δ u (q (δ)) w (q (δ)) + 1 − δ.
Because δ ∈ (0, 1), we must haveq (1) >q (δ) as claimed.
Becauseq (1) >q (δ), the allocation associated with the global circulation of private currencies Pareto dominates the allocation associated with the local circulation of private currencies. Our analysis in this section shows that network effects can be relevant for the welfare properties of equilibrium allocations in the presence of competing monies.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how a system of competing private currencies can work.
However, our evaluation of such a system is nuanced. While we offer glimpses of hope for it by showing the existence of stationary equilibria that deliver price stability, there are plenty of other less desirable equilibria. And even the best equilibrium does not deliver the socially optimum amount of money. At this stage of the research, we do not have any argument to forecast the empirical likelihood of each of these equilibria. Furthermore, we have shown that currency competition can be a socially wasteful activity.
Our analysis has also shown that the presence of privately issued currencies can create problems for monetary policy implementation under a money-growth rule. As we have seen, profit-maximizing entrepreneurs will frustrate the government's attempt to implement a positive real return on money when the public is willing to hold in portfolio privately issued currencies.
In view of these difficulties, we have characterized an alternative monetary policy rule that uniquely implements a socially efficient allocation by driving private monies out of the economy. We have shown that this policy rule is robust to other forms of private monies, such as those issued by automata. In addition, we have argued that, in a well-defined sense, currency competition provides market discipline to monetary policy implementation by inducing the government to provide "good" money to support exchange in the economy.
Finally, we have considered the possibility of implementing an efficient allocation with automaton issuers in an economy with productive capital. As we have seen, an efficient allocation can be the unique equilibrium outcome provided that capital is sufficiently productive.
We have, nevertheless, just scratched the surface of the study of private currency competition. Many topics, including the analysis of the different degrees of moneyness of private currencies (including interest-bearing assets and redeemable instruments), the role of positive transaction costs among different currencies, the entry and exit of entrepreneurs, the possibility of market power by currency issuers, or the consequences of the lack of enforceability of contracts are some of the avenues for future research that we hope to tackle shortly.
